President Javier Milei announced on Thursday, through a national broadcast and a statement from the Office of the President, that he had signed a regulatory decree and submitted the National Sovereignty Defence Bill to Congress. The measures respond to progress on the Sea Lion oil development in waters surrounding the Falkland Islands.
Beyond its diplomatic aspect and the amendment to Law 26,659 intended to impose tougher penalties on unauthorised hydrocarbon operations, the announcement sets out three decisions with direct implications for Argentina’s defence structure.
Three pillars of defence
The first is the creation of a National Security Council, designed to establish national security policy and ensure it is applied across the entire state. The official statement says its purpose is to enable a coordinated strategy for defending national sovereignty and territory. In practice, it would introduce a political-strategic leadership body that Argentina has lacked for decades, while most countries in the region already have equivalent institutions under different names.
The second measure is the introduction of a critical infrastructure protection regime. This is significant in the current international context: safeguarding energy, port, communications and power-generation hubs from hybrid threats - ranging from sabotage to cyber-attacks and the use of uncrewed systems - has become one of the most widespread areas of doctrinal restructuring among Western armed forces since the war in Ukraine. Putting it into practice requires dedicated surveillance, detection and response capabilities.
The third measure is the creation of an aerospace and maritime protection framework, which the official text says is intended to strengthen safeguards against all possible forms of attack on territorial integrity. It is the most materially demanding of the three initiatives, as it requires the ability to monitor, control and, if necessary, interdict airspace and maritime areas under national jurisdiction - the latter encompassing an Exclusive Economic Zone of more than one million square kilometres.
The statement also declares that “Defence, National Security, State Intelligence, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Economy must act in a coordinated manner”, arguing that “a prosperous Argentina, politically relevant and militarily respectable, is better placed to defend its territory, its resources and its sovereignty”.
The gap between policy and implementation
This approach has recent precedents. During the 2 April ceremony, the President himself announced that 10% of tax revenue from privatisations would be allocated to the purchase of weapons and capital goods, stating that the rebuilding of military capabilities *“must be a state policy”*. That framework was formally established at the end of July as Plan ARMA.
The issue is that this change in rhetoric exists alongside the tightest budgetary situation in the historical series. SIPRI’s database shows that Argentina devoted 0.56% of its GDP to defence in 2025, the lowest proportion recorded and one of the smallest in the world. The National Budget Office’s fourth-quarter execution report for that year recorded negative variances in flying hours, sailing days and operational activity across all three services, attributing them to material shortages and financial difficulties. In May this year, a budget amendment cut more than 48.900 billion pesos from Jurisdiction 45, including the removal of external credit intended for the acquisition of four light naval helicopters.
The naval case
The contrast is most apparent in the naval sphere, precisely where the announcement places the problem.
For years, the Argentine Navy has maintained its focus on defending the South Atlantic and controlling maritime areas under national jurisdiction, yet it has been unable to turn its capability-renewal plans into reality. The service operates MEKO 360 destroyers and MEKO 140 corvettes introduced during the 1980s - ARA Almirante Brown was delivered in 1983 and is approaching 45 years in service - while its submarine capability has been unavailable for nine years. The letter of intent for three Scorpène submarines, signed in 2024, remains dependent on securing financing.
The acquisitions that have been completed - Bouchard-class OPV offshore patrol vessels and P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft - have provided surveillance and presence capabilities, but they do not replace naval combat capacity or restore the submarine dimension. Meanwhile, the naval aviation strike capability was formally brought to an end in August with the announcement of the permanent retirement of the Super Étendard.
The presidential announcement sets out an institutional and regulatory framework for protecting maritime and aerospace areas. What remains unresolved is which assets will implement that framework, on what timetable, and with what budget allocation. Once released, the text of the bill and the articles of the regulatory decree will make it possible to assess whether the government’s changed approach will result in genuinely fulfilled requirements or join Argentina’s long list of strategic decisions without material backing.
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