China Aircraft Carriers: Why the Pentagon Expects Six by 2035

Beijing’s shipyards are operating at a tempo that is troubling military planners and prompting renewed scrutiny of Asia’s future balance of power.

The US Department of Defense now assesses that China may have at least six operational aircraft carriers by 2035, an expansion that would alter naval calculations from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Beneath that headline total lies a wider story of industrial strength, advancing technology and China’s intended use of these vessels during a crisis.

From coastal fleet to carrier power

Over the past 20 years, China’s navy has grown more rapidly than any other major fleet. Formerly centred on coastal defence, it now deploys well beyond Chinese waters, protecting tankers in the Gulf of Aden and demonstrating its presence in the central Pacific.

Chinese aircraft carriers are the most visible sign of this transformation. Liaoning, the first carrier, was a rebuilt Soviet hull used largely for training. Shandong, the second, became China’s first home-built carrier but retained a ski-jump flight deck. The third vessel, Fujian, represents a far more significant departure.

Fujian is the first Chinese carrier designed from the keel up for large deck operations with electromagnetic catapults.

This development is important because it points to a transition from an experimental capability towards a system that could be produced at scale. The Pentagon’s estimate of six carriers is based on the trajectory established by the first three ships, together with observable activity at China’s two principal naval shipyards: Dalian in the north and Jiangnan near Shanghai.

Why the Pentagon thinks six is realistic

US analysts are drawing on more than speculation. Satellite images and commercial shipping information reveal frequent transfers of major hull sections, cranes adapted for heavy lifting, and new dry docks designed for large surface warships.

Taken alongside Fujian’s comparatively compressed timetable - launched in 2022, beginning sea trials in 2024 and expected to enter service around 2025 - these indicators imply that China has established a durable construction and testing cycle.

The projection of six carriers by 2035 rests on one idea: that China can shift from bespoke prototypes to a planned production line.

In effect, this would require the completion of roughly one carrier every four to five years over the coming decade, whether as further Fujian-derived ships or a modestly revised “batch”. It is an ambitious target, but China’s broader shipbuilding performance makes it credible. It already launches more destroyers, frigates and large coastguard vessels annually than any other nation.

Three layers behind the headline number

Experts generally divide the question of six carriers into three connected areas:

• Industrial base: Can Dalian and Jiangnan keep delivering large hulls to schedule?
• Key technologies: Can catapults, arresting gear and carrier air wings develop quickly enough?
• Operational use: Can China assemble complete carrier strike groups with escorts, logistics and trained personnel?

The industrial element appears the strongest. China’s commercial shipbuilding sector already leads global orders for container vessels and tankers. Civilian methods including modular construction and parallel outfitting are increasingly being applied to naval production.

The technological and operational elements are more uncertain. They will determine whether six hulls become six capable carriers at sea, or instead a mixed force of front-line flagships and training platforms.

Fujian: a decisive test case

Fujian sits at the heart of this assessment because it brings together several technologies China has not previously operated at sea on this scale. It has electromagnetic catapults broadly comparable in concept to those aboard the US Navy’s newest Ford-class carriers. Its larger, less restricted deck arrangement than Liaoning and Shandong also supports more intensive flying operations.

Making those catapults consistently reliable will be a substantial challenge. The US experience underlines the difficulty: early faults with electromagnetic launch systems delayed the Ford class and added costs.

If China can stabilise Fujian’s systems within a few years, follow-on carriers could be built more rapidly on a standardised design.

The Chinese navy is also trialling new carrier aircraft, including the J-35 stealth fighter and advanced early-warning aircraft. Preparing pilots, flight-deck teams and maintenance staff for these platforms is likely to take nearly as long as constructing the ships.

Beyond the carrier: escorts, subs and logistics

Carriers do not operate by themselves. A credible carrier strike group requires air-defence destroyers, anti-submarine frigates, attack submarines, replenishment vessels and support aircraft. It additionally depends on several rotating crews and land facilities for maintenance.

China is therefore racing against time. Although it has greatly enlarged its force of Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers and produced large Type 901 supply ships, the navy must still integrate these assets into rehearsed operations over long distances. Western Pacific exercises during the past five years demonstrate a steep learning process, as well as shortcomings in coordination and endurance.

Component	Role in a Chinese carrier group
Destroyers (Type 052D/055)	Air defence, missile shield, command support
Frigates	Anti-submarine warfare and close escort
Attack submarines	Screening against enemy subs and surface ships
Replenishment ships	Fuel, ammunition and supplies at sea
Maritime patrol aircraft	Long-range surveillance and targeting support

Without these supporting layers, China could possess six carriers on paper while having far fewer able to operate far from home under full protection.

Strategic impact in Asia and beyond

A force of six Chinese carriers would still fall short of the US Navy’s 11 nuclear-powered carriers, yet it would reshape regional assessments. Even four fully deployable Chinese carriers would constrain Washington’s freedom of action during a Taiwan crisis or a confrontation in the South China Sea.

Regional states are already adapting. Japan is modifying its Izumo-class helicopter carriers to fly F-35B jets. South Korea is considering a light-carrier programme. India is assessing a third carrier as a hedge against both Pakistan and China in the Indian Ocean.

The rise of Chinese carrier power pushes Asian states toward new defence investments and tighter security partnerships with the US, UK and others.

For Washington, the issue extends beyond the number of Chinese carriers in service by 2035 to the way they are deployed. Routine Chinese carrier patrols near Guam or deep in the Indian Ocean would compel the US and its partners to distribute their forces more thinly over a larger area.

Scenarios for 2035

Defence planners outline several credible scenarios for 2035:

• High-end build-out: Six Chinese carriers in service, four of them fully operational with modern air wings and escorts, two used largely for training and secondary roles.
• Mixed success: Four to five carriers in the fleet, but with technical issues limiting sortie rates or deployment range for some ships.
• Slowed expansion: Economic strain, sanctions or technical setbacks stretch timelines, leaving China with three or four operational carriers and one or two under construction.

Every outcome would shape crisis planning in a different way. Under the high-end build-out scenario, China could keep at least one carrier strike group positioned close to key flashpoints while another remained ready at home, giving rivals less warning time.

Key terms and background for non-specialists

An aircraft carrier is often described as a “floating airbase”. Rather than depending on land runways, it carries aircraft able to launch and land at sea. Carriers extend a state’s reach by allowing it to project power far beyond its own coastline.

Two terms appear regularly in this discussion. The first, “carrier strike group”, refers to the collection of ships, submarines and aircraft that deploy alongside a carrier. The second, “sortie rate”, refers to the number of aircraft missions a carrier can launch and recover within a specified period. A high sortie rate matters more than the simple number of aircraft on the deck.

The difference between conventional and nuclear propulsion also influences perceptions. All existing Chinese carriers are believed to use conventional power, reducing endurance compared with US nuclear carriers while making them easier to build and maintain. Chinese naval planners may ultimately pursue nuclear-powered designs if they seek a continuous presence deep in the Pacific or Indian Ocean without regular refuelling.

Risks, limits and potential miscalculations

A fast carrier expansion also creates risks for Beijing. Prominent and highly visible emblems of military power can foster excessive confidence domestically, potentially encouraging leaders to accept greater risks during crises. Conversely, rivals could react too strongly by treating every new hull as a fully capable strike platform.

Financial and organisational strains are also significant. Carriers absorb an outsized portion of naval budgets, covering everything from construction and fuel to pilot training. As Chinese economic growth slows, the defence establishment will need to weigh spending on prestige programmes such as carriers against submarines, missiles and cyber capabilities that could provide more direct deterrence.

The greatest risk remains a misunderstanding of intentions. US and Chinese forces already operate close to one another in the South China Sea and near Taiwan. Introducing additional large and complex vessels, with fast jets operating above them, increases the possibility that an ordinary intercept or a radio misunderstanding could escalate into a wider conflict neither side sought.

For the moment, the Pentagon’s forecast of six carriers is better understood as a planning assumption than a firm prediction. It informs war games, procurement choices and alliance discussions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Whether or not China ultimately reaches that figure, the direction of travel is evident: aircraft carriers will remain central to Asia’s evolving maritime balance for years ahead.